Sweatt met all eligibility requirements for admission except for his race. At that time, Article VII, Section 7 of the Texas Constitution read: "Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, and impartial provision shall be made for both. With assistance from NAACP counsel, Sweatt sued in state court, requesting that the court require state and university officials to enroll him. The trial judge continued the case to give the state an opportunity to establish a "separate but equal" law school, and a temporary law school was opened in February , known as the School of Law of the Texas State University for Negroes.
After the establishment of the black law school, the state court dismissed Sweatt's case. Sweatt appealed the dismissal of the case to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the Texas admissions scheme continued to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court ruled that in states where public graduate and professional schools existed for white students but not for black students, black students must be admitted to the all-white institutions, and that the equal protection clause required Sweatt's admission to the University of Texas School of Law. Heman Marion Sweatt entered law school at the University of Texas in the fall of , as did several other blacks.
The case had a direct impact on the University of Texas because it permitted black applicants to apply to graduate and professional programs. Since the University of Texas adopted a narrow interpretation of Sweatt, black undergraduate students were not admitted.
Graduate students, however, were allowed to enroll in undergraduate courses when necessary for their program. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education. University authorities were required to deny him admission because of his race under Oklahoma statutes making it a misdemeanor to maintain, operate, teach, or attend a school at which both whites and blacks were enrolled or taught.
McLaurin filed a complaint to gain admission. On October 6, the Court for the Western District of Oklahoma found those parts of the Oklahoma statute that denied McLaurin admission unconstitutional, and held that the state had a constitutional duty to provide McLaurin with the education he sought as soon as it provided that education for applicants of any other group.
With this ruling the University's Board of Regents voted to admit McLaurin, but on a segregated basis. On October 13, , McLaurin entered the University. He sat at a designated desk on the mezzanine level of Bizzell Library rather than in the regular reading room, at a desk in an anteroom adjoining Classroom in Carnegie Hall, and ate at a separate time from the white students in the cafeteria.
His was perhaps the second application of any Black to the University of Texas. He met all eligibility requirements for admission except for his race. On that ground he was denied admission pursuant to Article VII, Section 7, of the Texas Constitution, which read: "Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, and impartial provision shall be made for both. The trial judge continued the case to give the state an opportunity to establish a "separate but equal" law school, and a temporary law school was opened in February , known as the School of Law of the Texas State University for Negroes.
The school of law was located in Austin in a house on Thirteenth Street north of the Capitol. The students had access to the Supreme Court library, and several members of the law faculty of the University of Texas School of Law taught the classes. Mandamus was then denied by the state courts of Texas pursuant to the separate but equal doctrine. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and thereafter held that the equal protection clause required Sweatt's admission to the University of Texas School of Law.
Sweatt enrolled at the beginning of the —51 school year, as did several other Blacks. Painter did not establish the invalidation of race separation per se by force of law, but the criteria used by the court in the application of the separate but equal doctrine gave legal experts cause to believe that the doctrine was virtually dead.
It was clear from the opinion that a good-faith effort to supply equality of treatment without integration was insufficient; rather, it must be equality in fact. The case had a direct impact on the University of Texas in that it provided for admission of Black applicants to graduate and professional programs. However, Black students could pursue only those degrees that were not available from Prairie View or Texas Southern, since the university opted for a narrow interpretation of Sweatt.
Black undergraduates were not admitted to the school. On remand, a hearing was held on the issue of the equality of the educational facilities at the newly established school as compared with the University of Texas Law School.
We granted certiorari, U. The University of Texas Law School, from which petitioner was excluded, was staffed by a faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time professors, some of whom are nationally recognized authorities in their field.
Its student body numbered The library contained over 65, volumes. Among the other facilities available to the students were a law review, moot court facilities, [ U. The law school for Negroes which was to have opened in February, , would have had no independent faculty or library. The teaching was to be carried on by four members of the University of Texas Law School faculty, who were to maintain their offices at the University of Texas while teaching at both institutions.
Few of the 10, volumes ordered for the library had arrived; [2] nor was there any full-time librarian. The school lacked accreditation. Since the trial of this case, respondents report the opening of a law school at the Texas State University for Negroes.
It is apparently on the road to full accreditation. It has a faculty of five full-time professors; a student body of 23; a library of some 16, volumes serviced by a full-time staff; a practice court and legal aid association; and one alumnus who has become a member of the Texas Bar.
Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the original or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law [ U.
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.
It is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would consider the question close. Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession, we are well aware that it is an intensely practical one. The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.
Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned. With such a substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.
It may be argued that excluding petitioner from that school is no different from excluding white students from the new law school. This contention overlooks realities.
It is unlikely that a member of a group so decisively in the majority, attending a school with rich traditions and [ U. That such a claim, if made, would be dishonored by the State, is no answer. Kraemer, U. It is fundamental that these cases concern rights which are personal and present. Board of Regents, U. Hurst, U. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
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